# Chapter 2: Blast Site Explosives Security

Acts of terrorism have underscored the salient difference between safety and security. Succinctly, safety involves protecting people and/or property from "unplanned" and "unintentional" accidents that may cause harm or damage. In contrast, security involves protecting people and/or property against "planned" and "intentional" acts that may cause harm or destruction.

The protection of the critical assets for explosives is safety and is well embodied in the manufacturing, handling, transport, storage, use and disposal of explosives. However, the importance of security in these same and other explosives industry is relatively new and the direct result of the rising tide of both domestic and international terrorism. This chapter addresses security issues relevant to the handling and use of explosives at blast sites.

The major terms used in this chapter are defined below.

**Blast site**
Blast site refers to a physical place where explosives are handled and used for legitimate purposes.

**Blast Site Security**
Blast site security refers to a system of security measures undertaken by a blast crew on a blast site to deny unauthorized persons physical access to explosives, to eliminate unexplained losses, and to protect against thefts of explosives.

**Explosives**
Explosives refer to both explosives materials (high explosives, blasting agents, and detonators), and precursor (explosive) chemicals (industrial grade ammonium nitrate prill and unsensitized bulk emulsions).

**Theft**
Theft refers to an illegal act to steal explosives.

**Unexplained Loss**
Unexplained loss refers to the discovery of a shortage of explosives that is verifiable but not explainable.

## Security Objectives

Security of explosives on a blast site involves three primary security objectives: (1) denying unauthorized persons physical access to explosives, (2) eliminating unexplained losses of explosives, and (3) protecting against thefts of explosives. This chapter will discuss three key security elements that are requisite to achieve the three primary security objectives: (1) personnel, (2) access control, and (3) inventory accountability.

Security systems are normally quite dependent on the use of electronic technologies. In contrast, contemporary blast site security is highly dependent on the blast crew, rather than on technology. As such, the success of blast site security rests heavily on the quality of two important blast crew attributes: (1) personnel surety, and (2) security training.

## Personnel

### Personnel Surety

The first important blast crew attribute, personnel surety, involves assuring individual trust of blasters, drivers and others who make up the blast crew. Everyone on the blast crew must be trusted by the very nature of their duties and responsibilities that grant them the authority to physical access and control over explosives handled on a blast site. Without such working latitude based on trust, the effective and efficient conduct of blasting operations would be seriously curtailed.

The primary security concern surrounding the blast crew handling explosives is an unusual theft of explosives perpetrated by someone on the blast crew. The threat of an internal theft may be compromised, uninformed through the ring, the implementation of personnel surety measures used to determine the trustworthiness of those who make up the blast crew.

The type and the quality of the personnel surety assessment process used to determine trustworthiness is a key performance factor in the success of blast site security. Personnel surety assessments may be categorized as initial and periodic. An initial assessment is conducted when a candidate is considered for employment on the blast crew, and is aimed at certifying the trustworthiness of the candidate. A periodic personnel surety assessment is conducted for those on the blast crew who have previously undergone an assessment and have subsequently worked a period of time on the blast crew handling explosives. There is no standard for the timeframe to conduct a periodic assessment. Once every 3 years may be appropriate in some cases. The periodic assessment is a recertification of the trustworthiness of an employee. The failure to conduct a personnel surety assessment, or the failure to conduct it properly, creates a vulnerability that may threaten blast site security.

There are several personnel surety assessment tools to consider. The tools used to certify and recertify trust include, but are not limited to those listed in table 2.1.

| **Personnel Surety Assessment Tools** |
|---|
| Test |
| Personal references |
| Prior employment |
| Pre-employment application |
| Nature of security clearance |
| Controlled substance and alcohol testing |
| Section of military background record (if applicable) |
| Criminal background check |
| Mental stability screening |
| Israel Watch list |

*Table 2.1 - Personnel surety assessment tools.*

It is recognized that there may be legal issues in some countries regarding the use of some of these assessment tools. Accordingly, the use of any of these tools must always be in strict compliance with all applicable labor statutes and regulations. However, it is important to understand that such legal barriers may undermine the genuine intention to derive an effective assessment of the trustworthiness of individuals who are under consideration to work with explosives.

In many countries, national protective forces composed of either police or military personnel are integral to explosive security from cradle-to-grave. As such, these protective forces may actively participate in blast site security and should always be recognized and respected for their valuable contributions. Coordination and cooperation with protective forces is vitally important to the success of blast site security. However, assumptions about their personnel surety assessments should be made. As such, it may be prudent to respectfully and diplomatically discuss the matter with the proper police or military chain-of-command.

Lastly, it would be an oversight not to mention that the use of temporary workers may be necessary to assist the blast crew in handling explosives on the blast site. These workers may be necessary in some countries where the use of packaged explosives is commonplace. It is prudent to recognize that temporary employees are rarely vetted and may represent potential security risks. Accordingly, if there is no process to assess their trustworthiness, then there is a need to have their work roles and duties clearly defined and boundaries established, along with control measures to closely monitor their activities.

### Blast Crew Security Training

The other important blast crew attribute is security training. Blast site security training instills not only proper security attitudes and behaviors, but is also crucial in the creation of a sustainable blast site security culture. Attitude is built in the mind, behavior is forged by action, and culture is day-to-day commitment. Everyone on the blast crew must be adequately trained to deny unauthorized persons access to explosives on a blast site, to account for explosives brought to and used on a blast site, and to protect against the theft of explosives on the blast site.

The content, type, and length of blast site security training may vary according to the specific needs of each organization, type of operation and the prevailing security environment. The content of the security training should not only be interesting and attractive, but also sufficiently comprehensive. Content should thoroughly cover the legal aspects of security, the definitions of terms used in security, the explosive security objectives, the organization's security policies and procedures, and an understanding of security threats, vulnerabilities, and risks. The length of training may be tailored according to the specific needs of the organization and the security environment in which the blasting work is conducted.

Security training should include at least some classroom or sit-down training. Classroom training should be sufficiently interactive, entail examples, and include problem-solving. Considerations to conduct in-class graded tests after each section of the training completed may be used to not only determine trainee retention of the subject matter, but also to assess the effectiveness of the instructor and the materials used.

Besides classroom training, it is crucial to conduct on-the-job security training. On-the-job security training should involve the assignment of a "security mentor" to a trainee. The mentor's role is simply to assist in developing the security skill sets necessary to create and sustain the blast site security culture. All security training, classroom and field, should be documented. Training methods should be periodically reviewed to determine areas requiring improvement.

## Access Control

Access control is the second key element of blast site security. Access control concerns the ability of a legitimate authority to permit or deny physical access to an area of concern. By default, the blast crew inherits the legitimate authority to control access to the blast site. Because unauthorized persons represent a potential external theft threat, the blast crew's main objective is to specifically deny them physical access to explosives handled and used on a blast site. Access control involves the three primary areas: (1) perimeter control, (2) critical asset protection, and (3) visitor control and monitoring.

### Perimeter Control

Blast site perimeter control represents a formidable challenge to blast site security. The challenge is due in part to the many variables that determine the dimensions of a blast site including, but not limited to its size, shape, and the standoff of the blast site to non-blasting people working adjacent to the blast site. Classical perimeter control involves the three "Gs": (1) gates, (2) guards, and (3) guns. In the classical sense, the three "Gs" describe a hierarchy of security measures that, when layered, become substantially more effective than if used alone. In some countries, it is not uncommon to observe armed guards protecting explosives. Guards are used in the classical sense to stop, credential, and authorize or deny passage. Physical gates do not physically exist at blast site perimeters. However, access points, places to ingress and egress, essentially become blast site "gates" through which people and vehicles must pass.

Blast site perimeters are always delineated or marked for safety purposes in order to separate blasting activities from non-blasting activities and to provide an appropriate warning about the inherent dangers present within. There are several methods commonly used to delineate a blast site and its access points. These include, but are not limited to, the use of hard and soft barricades such as oversize rock, orange and white striped "A-frames", large orange traffic safety cones, yellow plastic "caution" tape or combinations of any or all of these. From a security point standpoint, the delineation of the blast site perimeter for safety provides an excellent opportunity to "piggy-back" some form of security perimeter control at access points.

### Limited Access Points

Limiting the number of perimeter access points to the blast site is generally desirable for not only safety, but also for security. The more access points to the blast site, the more difficult the blast site will be to control. A single access point is perhaps the easiest to monitor, but it is the most difficult to establish.

Who should be allowed passage through an access point to the blast site? The purpose of an access point is to control "unauthorized" persons and vehicles. Unauthorized vehicle control is equally important as any vehicle may serve to immediately conceal and remove stolen explosives from the blast site without discovery. Denying unauthorized vehicle passage onto the blast site is important to protect against an external theft threat. Vehicles necessary for blasting operations are the only authorized blast site vehicles. Other vehicles are unauthorized unless permitted by the blasting security plan. Once unauthorized vehicles are stopped at the access points, all unauthorized persons become pedestrians whose actions are more effectively controlled and monitored.

### Deterrence Signage

Deterrence is one of the four "Ds" (deter, delay, detect, and defend). It is both physical and psychological in nature. Security signage, a physical thing, may be quite useful in creating a psychological deterrence to those who enter a blast site. The sign color, shape and the specific wording must be clearly contrasted against other blast site safety signage that might also be placed at the same access points. A simple illustration of a security signage is shown in figure 2.1.

![Figure 2.1: Security deterrence signage example](images/021.png)

*Figure 2.1 - Security deterrence signage example.*

> **SECURITY NOTICE**
>
> **ALL** Blast Site **VISITORS**
> **MUST** Report to the Blaster-in-Charge
>
> VISITOR VEHICLES
> **NOT** Permitted Beyond this Point

### Critical Asset Protection

Explosives are the critical assets that require protection on the blast site. Explosives must be protected against unauthorized physical access and external theft. Critical asset protection begins the moment explosives arrive on the blast site and continues until the remaining unused quantities of explosives are counted, stored, secured, and reshipped back to magazines.

The protection of the critical assets on the blast site necessarily involves the selection, implementation, and use of appropriate protective measures that effectively deny unauthorized physical access to explosives and prevent explosive theft. It is important to recognize that a particular protective measure that is effective for one type of explosives may not be effective for another. A set of effective protective measures for boosters kept in a cargo box with lockable doors is significantly different from protective measures needed for bulk emulsion. Each type of explosive, its packaging, and storage will determine the specific set of protective measures.

The implementation of protective measures involves a choice between convenience and security. On one hand, it is easier to choose a convenient method to do something as it requires the least amount of time and effort, assuming that it is safe and compliant. On the other hand, what is convenient may not necessarily be secure. An example of a convenience to allow a deliverer cargo door to be open during the loading process. However, keeping the door open provides unimpeded opportunity for theft directly through "piggy-back" access, is inconvenient but more secure. Determining the balance between convenience and security depends on the blasting operation, the nature of the security environment, the use of temporary unsupervised helpers, etc.

Protective measures must involve some degree of "layered" security to improve their effectiveness. Layered security, also known as "security-in-depth", represents a significant challenge to a would-be perpetrator, as they need to penetrate each layer of security without being discovered in order to reach the critical asset. The three protective measures of which implementation should be considered to structure layered protection on the blast site are (1) asset securement, (2) explosive-laden vehicle position, and (3) visitor control.

### Asset securement

Asset securement involves keeping explosive-laden vehicle cargo compartments, cargo containers, or cargo tanks and bins locked and secured at all times, except when an authorized opening is required to withdraw explosives for their immediate use. Locked means that a security device is properly attached to the closure apparatus and the lock device is properly functioning as designed. Always give several robust tugs downward on the body of a padlock to ensure that the locking mechanism is working properly.

Securement of bulk explosives and packaged explosives differs greatly from the viewpoint of frequency and accessibility. Bulk explosives are transported in large cargo or tank bins mounted on vehicles. Except for loading and unloading of bulk explosives, there may never be a requirement during blasting operations to open any bulk truck cargo tank or bin. Keeping these locked during blasting operations creates sufficient protection. On the other hand, units of bulk explosives potentially represent "soft" targets for theft attack. Inadequate grills on the bulk truck chassis platform or on the ground create certain vulnerabilities. Otherwise, bulk explosives are rather "hard" targets, because of their unique packaging and the manner in which they are transferred via augers and pumps directly into the blast holes.

Packaged explosives such as boosters, detonators, bagged ANFO, and cartridged emulsions must be secured behind doors that are equipped with security locking devices. These packaged explosives are "high-value" targets for potential theft attacks. Detonators in particular are "high-value" theft targets as they are small and easily concealed in a pocket or under a coat. Packaged explosive cargo areas are vulnerable when doors are left open or unlocked. Keeping these doors closed and locked when not making withdrawals must be considered to "harden" them against potential theft.

### Explosive-Laden Vehicle Position

Vehicles are used on blast sites for transport. The strategic positioning of parked explosive-laden vehicles on a blast site should not be overlooked as one of the measures to mitigate the potential for unauthorized access and theft. Selecting not only safe places to park vehicles but also secure places is crucial to blast site security. Additional measures to lock cabs and explosive cargo doors when vehicles are unattended provides an added layer of defense. Moreover, measures to orient vehicles so that cargo doors face in the direction of the blast site where the blast crew is working enhances monitoring. Lastly, measures to avoid parking vehicles adjacent to any blast site access point further diminish the vulnerability of the critical assets to unauthorized access and theft.

On a blast site, many explosive-laden vehicles, like bulk vehicles, must continually move from borehole-to-borehole. The continued movement of explosive-laden vehicles on the blast site is difficult for the establishment of secure positioning strategies. In such cases, security efforts must be highly focused on cargo securement and keeping unauthorized persons at a standoff distance from these operating vehicles, unless operations are escorted by a member of the blast crew.

### Visitor Control And Monitoring

All persons entering a blast site are either authorized or unauthorized. Unauthorized persons have neither direct nor indirect security responsibilities for the explosives on the immediate blast site. Visitors to the blast site are unauthorized persons. Visitors, including inspectors, must never be permitted unescorted physical access to explosives on the blast site. Escorting visitors on the blast site may be time-consuming, but it is nevertheless prudent not only for security but also for safety. Visitor behavior needs to be continuously monitored as a theft may be an impulsive act rather than a pre-planned act. Rationally, it must be recognized that visitors may enter the blast site for legitimate reasons. Visitors may include familiar operational managers and engineers, drillers, or perhaps mine or project inspectors. Treating all visitors with not only professionalism but also with cautious respect is both tactful and security-minded.

## Inventory Accountability

Unexplained losses on blast sites are preventable by adopting rigorous procedures to account for all explosives—the third key element in blast site security. From a security viewpoint, unexplained losses of explosives may be considered tantamount to explosives theft. Speculation about any unexplained loss does not soothe the reality that it could as fact be a bona fide theft. Every theft of explosive does in fact create a liability for potential consequences.

The serious nature of unexplained explosive losses is ample reason to promptly report them to the appropriate authorities. In many countries, it is required not only to report the theft of explosives but also the loss of explosives. For example, in the U.S., the Federal Explosives Law and Regulations (2012) requires persons who have knowledge of either a theft or loss to report it within 24 hours of discovery to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and local law enforcement.

> **Caution**
>
> In the U.S., the Federal Explosives Law and Regulations (2012) requires persons who have knowledge of either a theft or loss to report it within 24 hours of discovery to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and local law enforcement.

The blast crew has the responsibility to implement explosives accountability on the blast site by implementing rigorous inventory control measures aimed at eliminating unexplained losses. In some countries, the responsibility for explosive accountability may be either shared with, or deferred to protective forces.

The inventory control equation below may be used as an effective tool in accountability of explosives on the blast site:

**Equation 2.1** <!-- VERIFIED -->

$$\text{Preblast } Q_e = \text{Blast } Q_e + \text{Post Blast } Q_e$$

Where:
- Preblast $Q_e$ = Verified and recorded quantity of explosives physically shipped to the blast site.
- Blast $Q_e$ = Verified and recorded physical quantity of explosives used in the blast.
- Post Blast $Q_e$ = Verified and recorded physical quantity of explosives remaining after use.

In the equation above, $Q_e$ means the quantity of explosives accounted for as it arrives at the blast site (*See* figure 2.2) by brand, type, length, delay, size, weight, etc. (*See* figure 2.3). These are separately identified in transportation shipping records and blast reports. For example, if 200 each of 450-gram boosters and 200 each of 225-gram boosters are ordered and shipped to the blast site, they each must be accounted for separately by the inventory control equation.

It is a fact that unexplained losses of explosives do occasionally occur. The hope is always that these unexplained losses were not losses but rather were used somewhere in the blast, but were not accounted for. That may not always be the case.

The following example details a hypothetical example of an unexplained loss. The root causes of the loss are both human and systemic. In the example, there is no actual loss.

![Figure 2.2: Explosives arriving on the blast site](images/024.png)

*Figure 2.2 - Explosives arriving on the blast site. (Courtesy: Austin Powder Company)*

A blast's order of bags of ANFO is withdrawn from a magazine and loaded into an explosives vehicle to be transported to a blast site. During the transfer of the ANFO bags from the magazine to the vehicle cargo box, the person makes an accounting error of 1 bag as it is loaded. Instead of removing 200 bags from the magazine, as shown on the shipment record, 201 bags were removed. The counting error creates the conditions for the unexplained loss, as there are no other procedures in place that will catch this error.

Upon the arrival of the shipment of bagged ANFO to the blast site, the blast crew does not have a procedure in place to verify the ANFO bag quantities that arrive on the blast site. Additionally, the blaster does not have a procedure or place to account for what is loaded into boreholes. After the blast is loaded, the remaining bags of ANFO on the vehicle are counted. There are 11 bags of ANFO remaining to be returned to the magazine. When these are returned to the magazine, they are counted without error. The magazine records will show 200 taken out and 11 returned, a disposition of 189 bags, on the day of the blast.

When the blaster prepares the blast log, it will indicate that 189 bags of ANFO (200-11=189) were used. The blast log and the magazine record balance and this eventually sets the stage for the unexplained loss. During the next magazine inventory, it is discovered that the physical count of bagged ANFO is "short" by 1 bag when compared to the magazine's perpetual inventory record. A review of all records of disposition, matched against all blast records, fails to determine the disposition of the missing bag of ANFO. An unexplained loss "apparently" has occurred. Unfortunately, the unexplained loss cannot be traced to the aforementioned blast. Fortunately, this is not an actual loss of explosive, but a loss of control.

The inventory control equation must always balance; otherwise there is an unexplained loss of explosives. The task to ensure that it balances involves the three key inventory control procedures to (1) count, record and verify the quantity of explosives shipped to the blast site (Preblast $Q_e$), (2) count, record and verify the quantity of explosives used on the blast site (Blast $Q_e$), and (3) count, record and verify the quantity of explosives returned from the blast site (Post Blast $Q_e$).

The hypothetical blast that follows will illustrate measures which may be used to sustain inventory control. The hypothetical blast design entails 2-rows of 25 drill holes each. The drill holes in the front row are identified as A-1 through A-25, while the drill holes in the back row are identified as B-1 to B-25.

| **Hypothetical Blast Quantities** |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Explosives** | **Units** | **Blast Design Requirement** | **Blaster "extra" explosives** | **Order** |
| Booster 450 g | Each | 50 | 5 | 55 |
| Booster 225 g | Each | 50 | 5 | 55 |
| Det. 475 ms | Each | 50 | 5 | 55 |
| Det. 500 ms | Each | 50 | 5 | 55 |
| Det. 42 ms | Each | 96 | 4 | 100 |
| Det. 17 ms | Each | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| Starter | Each | 1 | 1 | 2 |

*Table 2.2 - Hypothetical blast quantities.*

The hypothetical blast is illustrated in tables 2.2 through 2.6. For simplification only boosters and detonators are tracked in table 2.2. The blast design requirements are shown in the second column for each explosives type. The third column is the blaster's estimate to meet the blast design criteria. The last column is what the blaster actually ordered shipped to the blast. Notice that the blaster ordered "extra" explosives—quite common in blasting.

### Preblast Counting, Recording, and Verifying

This initial control measure involves counting the shipment of explosives when it arrives (*See* figure 2.3) and before it is used. The counting involves physically verifying the arrival quantities and types with the explosives shipment record. As a best practice, it is recommended to employ a "two-person" count. Only authorized persons who are members of the blast crew should perform the "two-person" count. The two counts should be independently conducted and subsequently compared. If the two counts are not in agreement, then there is an obligation to recount. If counts are in agreement, then the count is recorded by both counting persons. Table 2.3 shows the recording of the verification of explosives that arrived on the blast site.

![Figure 2.3: Blaster and driver counting explosives upon arrival](images/025.png)

*Figure 2.3 - Blaster and driver counting explosives upon arrival. (Courtesy: Austin Powder Company)*

| **Verification Of The Arrival Count** |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Explosives** | **Arrival Shipment Count** | **Person Verifying (initials)** | **Blast Quantity Used** | **Blaster Verifying (initials)** | **Departure Shipment Count** | **Person Verifying (initials)** |
| Booster 450 g | 55 | JCB/APC | | | | |
| Booster 225 g | 55 | JCB/APC | | | | |
| Det. 475 ms | 55 | JCB/APC | | | | |
| Det. 500 ms | 55 | JCB/APC | | | | |
| Det. 42 ms | 100 | JCB/APC | | | | |
| Det. 17 ms | 5 | JCB/APC | | | | |
| Starter | 2 | JCB/APC | | | | |

*Table 2.3 - Verification of the arrival count.*

After the arrival shipment of explosives is counted and verified, the blaster should determine if the delivered shipment quantities are sufficient to charge the blast. In our hypothetical example, the delivered explosives are precisely what the blaster ordered.

### Blast Counting, Recording, and Verifying

This control measure involves the continuous recording of explosives used during loading (*See* figure 2.4) on a borehole-by-borehole basis. Table 2.4 illustrates the blaster's record for boreholes (e.g. A-1 through A-10).

![Figure 2.4: Blaster counting explosives during loading](images/027.png)

*Figure 2.4 - Blaster counting explosives during loading. (Courtesy: Austin Powder Company)*

| **Example Of Blaster Use Record** ||||
|---|---|---|---|
| **Borehole** | **Booster** | **In-hole Detonator(s)** | **Surface Detonator** |
| A1 | 450 | 42 | |
| A2 | 450 | 42 | |
| A3 | 450 | 42 | |
| A4 | 450 | 42 | |
| A5 | 450 | 42 | |
| A6 | 450 | 42 | |
| A7 | 450 | 42 | |
| A8 | 450 | 42 | |
| A9 | 450 | 42 | |
| A10 | 450 | 42 | |

*Table 2.4 - Example blaster use record.*

transferred to the table as shown in table 2.5.

| **Blaster Consumption Of Explosives** |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Explosives** | **Arrival Shipment Count** | **Person Verifying (initials)** | **Blast Quantity Used** | **Blaster Verifying (initials)** | **Departure Shipment Count** | **Person Verifying (initials)** |
| Booster 450 g | 55 | JCB/APC | 50 | DT | | |
| Booster 225 g | 55 | JCB/APC | 50 | DT | | |
| Det. 475 ms | 55 | JCB/APC | 50 | DT | | |
| Det. 500 ms | 55 | JCB/APC | 50 | DT | | |
| Det. 42 ms | 100 | JCB/APC | 96 | DT | | |
| Det. 17 ms | 5 | JCB/APC | 2 | DT | | |
| Starter | 2 | JCB/APC | 1 | DT | | |

*Table 2.5 - Blaster consumption of explosives.*

### Post Blast Counting, Recording, and Verifying

This control measure involves performing an accurate count of all of the explosives prior to their departure (*See* table 2.6) from the blast site to magazines. A "two-person" system of counting should once again be used to count and verify the quantities for the departure shipment. The record shown as figure 2.5 shows the results (highlighted).

![Figure 2.5: Final record of explosives used in the blast](images/028.png)

*Figure 2.5 - Final record of explosives used in the blast. (Courtesy: Austin Powder Company)*

| **Inventory Balance Of Shot Quantities** |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Explosives** | **Arrival Shipment Count** | **Person Verifying (initials)** | **Shot Quantity Used** | **Blaster Verifying (initials)** | **Departure Shipment Count** | **Person Verifying (initials)** |
| Booster 450 g | 55 | JCB/APC | 50 | DT | 5 | DPT/ICB |
| Booster 225 g | 55 | JCB/APC | 50 | DT | 5 | DPT/ICB |
| Det. 475 ms | 55 | JCB/APC | 50 | DT | 5 | DPT/ICB |
| Det. 500 ms | 55 | JCB/APC | 50 | DT | 5 | DPT/ICB |
| Det. 42 ms | 100 | JCB/APC | 96 | DT | 4 | DPT/ICB |
| Det. 17 ms | 5 | JCB/APC | 2 | DT | 3 | DPT/ICB |
| Starter | 2 | JCB/APC | 1 | DT | 1 | DPT/ICB |

*Table 2.6 - Inventory balance of blast quantities.*

Applying the inventory control equation for each type of explosives above results in a verified balance of all blast quantities. For this hypothetical blast, explosives were double-counted upon arrival and upon departure and were accounted for by the blaster piece-by-piece. All counting was verified and recorded. At the end of the day, the blaster's blast log and all shipping records associated with this blast and the returned explosives inventory for the magazine will accurately match. The objective of preventing unexplained losses is successfully achieved in this hypothetical blast. Good job!

![Figure 2.6: Blaster securing unused explosives after loading](images/030.png)

*Figure 2.6 - Blaster securing unused explosives after loading. (Courtesy: Austin Powder Company)*

## Summary

Explosives security, much like explosives safety, is of paramount importance to the explosives industry and to the general public. One of the areas of explosives security that must not be overlooked involves the blast site security of explosives. The development, implementation, and use of security measures to deny unauthorized persons access to explosives on a blast site, to eliminate unexplained losses and to protect against thefts of explosives on a blast site must be considered part of every comprehensive explosives security plan. This chapter encourages all security stakeholders to undertake the necessary steps to ensure the success of explosives security measures on their blast sites.

## Additional Resources

Arata, Michael J. 2006. Physical security, McGraw-Hill, Two Penn Plaza, New York, NY.

Austin Powder Company. 2004. Inventory management/accountability policy. Austin Powder Company, Cleveland, OH

Austin Powder Company. 2005. "Two-count" policy. Austin Powder Company, Cleveland, OH.

U.S. Department of the Army. 2001. FM 3-19.30-Physical security. U.S. Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2009. Risk-based Performance Standards. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.